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Highlights 
 Credit supply distortion adversely impacts corporate investment efficiency. 
 Managerial forecast ability mitigates the adverse effect of credit supply distortion for 
non-SOEs but not for SOEs.  
 Negative credit supply distortions have a greater impact on corporate investment 
efficiency and managerial forecast ability is important in reducing underinvestment. 
 Financial stability should be properly considered within the monetary policy 
framework. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to study the interaction among corporate investment efficiency, credit 
supply distortion and managerial forecast ability in China. We provide robust evidence that credit 
distortion adversely affects corporate investment efficiency, while better managerial forecast ability 
mitigates this negative effect. Subsample analyses show that managerial forecast ability mitigates the 
adverse effect of credit supply distortion for non-state-owned enterprises but not for state-owned 
enterprises. We also find evidence that negative credit supply distortions have a greater impact on 
corporate investment efficiency and managerial forecast ability is particularly important in reducing 
underinvestment.  
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1. Introduction 
In the neo-classical framework, managers make optimal investment decisions to maximize the firm 
value according to the marginal Q ratio. However, firms may depart from this optimal level in practice, 
resulting in investment inefficiency. The existing literature focuses on the impact of firm-level factors on 
investment efficiency, such as the quality of financial reports, financial constraints, as well as agency costs 
(Biddle et al., 2009; Guariglia and Yang, 2016), while neglecting to examine whether distortion of external 
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conditions causes corporate investment inefficiency, since corporate investment behaviour is sensitive to 
credit availability (Cingano et al., 2016). We investigate the impact of credit supply distortion on corporate 
investment efficiency and expect that distortion in the credit supply may induce distorted investment, and 
reduce investment efficiency.
1
 
More importantly, firm investment decisions rely on managerial forecast for the project payoff, cash 
flow and product demand, as well as the external environment among others. Managers with better forecast 
quality make more efficient investment (Goodman et al., 2014). Engelhardt (2012) argues that wiser 
entrepreneurs with better forecast ability may predict the distorting effects of credit supply and thereby 
make better investment decisions during a credit expansion. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence 
and we intend to fill this gap. Specifically, we test whether better managerial forecast ability can mitigate 
the adverse impact of credit distortion on corporate investment efficiency.  
We focus on the Chinese credit market, which has emerged as the world’s biggest ‘money printing 
machine’ since 2009. Chinese state-owned banks dominate financial markets and banking loans serve as 
the key financial tool for corporate investment (Allen et al., 2012). However, Chinese government 
intervention through state-owned banks can cause credit supply distortions.
2
 In addition, alternative 
corporate financing channels are limited. This creates an ideal laboratory for us to test the role of credit 
supply distortion on corporate investment decisions. 
Our work is related and contributes to the studies on the impact of credit supply on corporate 
activities. Previous studies are either concerned with the channel through which credit shock affects 
corporate financing and investment by exploiting a specific event (e.g., Iyer et al., 2014; Cingano et al., 
2016), or investigate the impact of a continuous credit supply cycle on corporate activities (e.g., Becker & 
Ivashina, 2014). However, there is a lack of literature discussing whether credit supply distortion causes 
corporate investment inefficiency. This paper stands as an initial attempt to examine the role of credit 
supply distortion on corporate investment efficiency and its relevant mechanism empirically. We find that 
credit supply distortion reduces corporate investment efficiency robustly.  
The second contribution is that we provide new insights into corporate investment behaviour and 
highlight the role of managerial skills in terms of forecast ability. Although managerial forecast ability 
                                                        
1 In this paper, credit supply distortion refers to the deviation from the expected credit supply. The investment distortion 
(inefficiency) means the deviation from the expected firm investment. 
2 A recent example is the four trillion stimulus plan of Chinese government in 2008. 
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cannot be observed directly, Goodman et al. (2014) argue that managerial earnings forecast quality can 
serve as a proxy for the investment forecast ability and managers with better forecast ability can make 
more efficient investment. Engelhardt (2012) indicates that astute entrepreneurs with better forecast ability 
may recognize the distorting effect of credit policy and thereby make better investment decisions. In this 
paper, we intend to empirically investigate whether better managerial forecast ability can mitigate the 
negative effects of credit supply distortion on corporate investment efficiency. 
The third contribution is that we distinguish between the performances of managers from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Our motivation is that most managers in 
SOEs are appointed by the Chinese government. On the one hand, these managers tend to cater to 
government policy as politicians instead of simply focusing on maximizing profit (Chen et al., 2006), 
which might lead to investment inefficiency during the credit distortion period. On the other hand, SOEs’ 
connection to government might facilitate their ability to obtain credit support from state-owned banks 
(Allen et al., 2012). Our empirical results document that credit supply distortion decreases the investment 
efficiency for both SOEs and non-SOEs, while the managerial forecast ability only plays an effective role 
to mitigate the negative impact of credit supply distortion in non-SOEs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the data and methodology in Section 2. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical results along with robustness tests and extension analyses. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Sample selection 
We study quarterly investment performance of publicly listed companies on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China, excluding Special Treatment (ST)
3
 companies and financial 
companies. Quarterly data help facilitate the exploration of the short-term macroeconomic impacts on firm 
investment behavior and strengthen the statistic power (Duchin et al., 2010; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Becker 
and Ivashina, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). The firm-level accounting data and managerial earnings forecast 
data are retrieved from the WIND financial database. The credit-related data are gathered from the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The sample spans from 
                                                        
3 ST companies are companies with financial troubles or in abnormal situations. 
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2003Q1 to 2015Q4. 
2.2.  Methodology and variables 
To investigate the impact of credit supply distortion on corporate investment efficiency and how 
managerial forecast ability affects their relation, we estimate the following equations: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖s𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 (1) 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡   (2)                                                
Invest_Eff is the corporate investment efficiency, which is obtained from the expected investment 
model (Biddle et al., 2009, Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014 and Goodman et al., 2014). We firstly calculate the 
residual ωi,t by regressing the lagged growth rate of sales on investment
4
 cross-sectionally for each year 
and industry.
5
 The intuition of the expected investment model is that a firm’s investment is a function of 
its growth opportunity that is measured by the sales growth rate,
6
 while the predicted value and residual of 
expected investment model proxy expected investment and unexpected (or abnormal) investment, 
respectively. A positive residual means overinvestment and a negative value means underinvestment. 
Therefore, the residuals measure investment inefficiency, increasing with the absolute value of the 
residuals. Then we multiply the absolute value of the residual by (-1) to get the investment efficiency 
denoted by Invest_Eff. The investment efficiency increases with the value of Invest_Eff. 
Distortion measures the credit supply distortion. Inspired by Povel et al. (2016) and Mendoza and 
Terrones (2008), we get the residual et from regressing the logarithm of real credit per capita
7
 on the time 
trend and then set Distortion as the absolute value of et/σ(et), where σ(et) is the standard deviation of et. 
Credit supply distortion increases with the value of Distortion.  
We construct three proxies for Forecast. Forecast measures the managerial forecast ability based on 
the managerial earnings forecast information. Inspired by Goodman et al. (2014) and Hilary et al. (2014), 
we use forecast accuracy and forecast consistency as well as their mean value to measure the managerial 
forecast ability. We firstly compute the managerial forecast error which is the difference between the 
forecasted net profit growth rate and the actual value.
8
 As a smaller absolute value of forecast errors 
                                                        
4 Investment = capital expenditure / total assets in the last period. 
5 At least 20 available observations are required. 
6 We also use the Tobin’s Q instead of sales growth as the proxy for growth opportunity in the robustness test. 
7 The logarithm of real credit per capita = Ln (real credit adjusted by the CPI in 2000Q1 / total population size). Here, the 
population census data are of annual frequency, while the credit data are quarterly, so we decompose the population data into 
quarterly frequency with the quadratic-match average method. Results are also consistent if we do not adjust for the 
population size. 
8
 In the US market, Hilary et al. (2014) and Goodman et al. (2014) measure the forecast ability by comparing the forecasted 
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means higher forecast accuracy (Goodman et al., 2014), we define managerial forecast accuracy (Facc) as 
an indicator variable that equals one if the average absolute value of a firm’s managerial forecast errors 
over the whole sample period is less than its industry median, otherwise zero. Similarly, a smaller variation 
of forecast errors means larger forecast consistency (Hilary et al., 2014), we define managerial forecast 
consistency (Fcon) as an indicator variable that equals one if the standard deviation of a firm’s managerial 
forecast errors over the sample period is less than its industry median, otherwise zero. The third proxy for 
managerial forecast ability is denoted as Facccon which takes on the mean value of Facc and Fcon. These 
three proxies, Facc, Fcon and Facccon are firm-level time-invariant variables. 
Control is a vector of control variables that may influence corporate investment behavior. These 
variables include sales divided by total assets (Sales), net cash flow from operating divided by total assets 
(Cash), total liabilities divided by total assets (Leverage), net income divided by total assets (ROA), 
overhead expenses divided by total assets (Agency) (Huang et al., 2011), the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets (Tangibility), financial constraints (SA index) (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), market-to-book asset 
value (MTB), inventory divided by total assets (Inventory), accounts payable divided by total assets 
(Payable).
9
 We lag these control variables by one period and winsorize them at the 1% and 99% levels to 
mitigate any undue influences of outliers. We estimate the regression using the fixed-effect model with 
firm, year and quarter fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors at the firm-level to adjust for the 
heteroskedasticity within firms. We do not include Forecast as an independent variable in the baseline 
regression because the firm fixed effect absorbs this time-invariant variable. The similar identification can 
be found in Duchin et al., (2010) and Cavallo et al. (2013). We also construct time-variant proxies for 
managerial forecast ability in the robustness check and we include both this variable and its interaction 
term in the regression. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
EPS with the actual EPS. However, listed companies in China only disclose the forecasted net profit and the growth rate of 
net profit but do not directly disclose forecasted EPS. We notice that in our sample, there are more companies choosing to 
disclose forecasted net profit growth rate rather than net profit. For the sake of consistency, in our analysis, we select the net 
profit growth rate to construct our proxies. The forecast-related data are retrieved from the WIND database. 
 
9 The summary statistics for all the variables are shown in the Appendix. 
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Baseline model results 
Column (1) of Table 1 are the baseline results for Equations (1). As expected, the key independent 
variable Distortion is negatively associated with investment efficiency and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that the credit supply distortion decreases corporate investment efficiency. Specifically, 
the coefficient of Distortion in column (1) is –0.002, implying that as credit supply distortion increases one 
standard deviation, corporate investment efficiency decreases 0.001
10
 units on average, which is 5.5% 
over the sample mean. 
Columns (2) – (4) show the results for Equations (2) with various proxies for managerial forecast 
ability. The interaction terms between managerial forecast ability and credit supply distortion carry positive 
signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding indicates that credit supply distortions 
hamper investment efficiency to a lesser extent in those companies whose managers have better forecast 
ability. 
3.2. Robustness tests 
In Table 2 we implement several robustness tests to provide additional support for our baseline model 
findings. Firstly, we only include firms with at least 20 and 30 managerial forecast observations to ensure 
enough observations when constructing measurements for managerial forecast ability. Secondly, we try an 
alternative measurement of credit supply distortion (Distortion_2) by using the absolute value of the 
deviation from the long-run trend in the logarithm of real credit per capita with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter (Panel B). Thirdly, to mitigate the concern that managerial forecast ability may vary with time, we 
construct time-variant measurements for managerial forecast ability (Panel C). Specifically, we define the 
time-variant managerial forecast accuracy (Facc_2) as an indicator variable that equals one if the average 
absolute value of the managerial forecast errors in a given year is below its industry median, otherwise 
zero. The time-variant managerial forecast consistency (Fcon_2) is also an indicator variable that equals 
one if the standard deviation of the managerial forecast errors in a given year is below its industry median, 
otherwise zero. Similarly, Facccon_2 is the mean value of Facc_2 and Fcon_2. Finally, we estimate the 
expected investment model with Tobin’s Q instead of sales growth as the proxy for growth opportunity and 
                                                        
10 0.001=0.002*0.584 where 0.584 is the standard deviation of Distortion.  
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the new investment efficiency is denoted as Invest_Eff_2 (Panel D).
11
 All the results are consistent with 
those from the baseline model. 
3.3. Extension analyses 
In Table 3, we conduct some extension analyses to examine the roles of ownership structure, the 
split-share structure reform and the financial crisis. We also study the impact of different kinds of credit 
supply distortion on investment inefficiency. In Panel A we separate the firms into SOEs and non-SOEs, as 
the effects of government credit across different levels of the supply chain could be distinct (Huang et al., 
2011; Ru, 2017). The results show that the credit supply distortion decreases the corporate investment 
efficiency for both SOEs and non-SOEs while the interaction terms are not statistically significant for 
SOEs. This may suggest that many SOE managers are appointed politically and their social and political 
goals undermine corporate interests (Chen et al., 2006).  
In Panel B, we divide the sample into periods before the split-share structure reform (2003-2007) and 
after the split-share structure reform (2008-2015), as the Chinese government launched the split-share 
structure reform during 2005-2007 and most firms finished their reform in the end of 2007 (Liao et al., 
2014). The results show that the baseline conclusions mainly apply to the post-reform subsample, which 
implies that after the split-share reform, the Chinese stock market is more sensitive to monetary policy 
changes.  
In Panel C, we divide the sample into crisis and non-crisis subperiods and re-run the regressions. We 
define the years 2008-2013 as the financial crisis period, which covers both the US subprime crisis and the 
European debt crisis. It is evident that during the financial crisis period, the credit distortion impairs 
corporate investment efficiency. However, there is little evidence that the managerial forecast ability can 
mitigate the negative effects of credit distortion in this particular subsample. As a comparison, we see that, 
to a certain extent, managerial forecast ability still plays a role during the non-crisis period.  
In Panel D, we investigate the effect of political connections since political connections help firm 
access to bank loans (Cumming et al., 2016). We define a firm as with political connections if at least one 
of its senior managers (including directors) is or was government official, the People’s Congress (PC) 
member or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) member. The credit supply 
                                                        
11 In an untabulated table, we use the analyst forecasted earnings instead of the firm’s actual earnings as the benchmark to 
construct the managerial forecast ability to mitigate the concern that managers with lower integrity may manipulate the 
earnings (Chen et al., 2013) to cater to their forecast. 
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distortion decreases investment efficiency for both subsamples, but only statistically significant for firms 
without political connections. However, the managerial forecast ability plays a mitigating role in the 
politically connected firms. These results are consistent with Cumming et al. (2016) that political 
connections mitigate the financial constraint on the investment.12 
In Panel E, we analyze cases when positive and negative credit supply distortions are taken into 
account separately. We expect that positive credit distortions (Distortion_P) promote corporate 
overinvestment and negative credit distortions (Distortion_N) cause corporate underinvestment. The 
dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) is Overinvestment which takes on the value of ωi,t if ωi,t is positive 
and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable Distortion_P takes on the value of et/σ(et) if et is positive 
and 0 otherwise. In columns (4) – (6), the dependent variable is Underinvestment which takes on the 
absolute value of ωi,t if ωi,t is negative and 0 otherwise. The negative distortion Distortion_N takes on the 
absolute value of et/σ(et) if et is negative and 0 otherwise. We find that both coefficients in front of 
Distortion_P and Distortion_N are positive, but not statistically significant for Distortion_P. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms are negative, but only statistically significant for 
Distortion_N*Forecast. These results show that managerial forecast ability is particularly important in 
terms of helping reduce underinvestment. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Credit supply plays an important role in corporation financing decisions and it also sends out key 
signals to guide companies on investment decisions making. Corporate investment efficiencies also hinge 
upon managerial forecast accuracy and consistency. In this paper, we investigate how credit distortion 
affects corporate investment efficiency and the role played by managerial forecast ability. Our empirical 
analyses document that credit distortions adversely affect corporate investment efficiency, especially in the 
periods after the split-share structure reform and during the financial crisis, while better managerial 
forecast ability mitigates this negative effect but only for non-SOEs. Additionally, our findings indicate a 
greater impact from negative credit supply distortions on corporate investment efficiency and underscore 
the importance of managerial forecast ability in reducing underinvestment. Most importantly, our results 
                                                        
12 The information on political connections is collected from the CSMAR Financial Database and it started from 2008, 
resulting in the smaller sample size compared to those in the baseline results. 
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demonstrate that changes in credit supply within the financial system inevitably affect the real economy. 
From the policymakers’ point of view, financial stability should be properly considered within the 
monetary policy framework given the importance of credit supply. 
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Table 1. Baseline results 
This table reports the results for Equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is investment efficiency (Invest_Eff). 
Distortion is the proxy for credit supply distortion. Facc, Fcon and Facccon are proxies for managerial forecast ability. 
Please refer to Subsection 2.2 for variable definitions. The year and quarter effect as well as the firm fixed effect are 
controlled for in all regressions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distortion -0.002
***
 -0.002
***
 -0.002
***
 -0.002
***
 
 
(-3.92) (-4.12) (-4.00) (-4.15) 
Distortion
*
Facc 
 
0.001
**
 
  
  
(2.04) 
  Distortion*Fcon 
  
0.001
**
 
 
   
(2.09) 
 Distortion*Facccon 
   
0.001
**
 
    
(2.14) 
Sales 0.005
***
 0.005
***
 0.005
***
 0.005
***
 
 
(2.82) (2.79) (2.83) (2.78) 
Cash -0.009
***
 -0.009
***
 -0.009
***
 -0.009
***
 
 
(-3.11) (-3.20) (-3.09) (-3.19) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-1.22) (-1.26) (-1.17) (-1.25) 
ROA 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 
(1.47) (1.47) (1.50) (1.48) 
Agency 0.047
**
 0.045
*
 0.041
*
 0.045
*
 
 
(2.01) (1.92) (1.74) (1.92) 
Tangibility 0.004 0.004 0.004
*
 0.004 
 
(1.61) (1.62) (1.65) (1.63) 
SA index -0.014
***
 -0.014
***
 -0.014
***
 -0.014
***
 
 
(-10.99) (-10.94) (-10.83) (-10.96) 
MTB -0.001
***
 -0.001
***
 -0.002
***
 -0.001
***
 
 
(-8.51) (-8.57) (-8.84) (-8.58) 
Inventory 0.015
***
 0.016
***
 0.015
***
 0.016
***
 
 
(6.64) (6.76) (6.66) (6.76) 
Payable -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.18) (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.26) 
Constant -0.042
***
 -0.042
***
 -0.042
***
 -0.042
***
 
 
(-16.23) (-16.17) (-16.01) (-16.18) 
Year & Quarter Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 62,403 60,168 60,168 60,168 
Adj. R
2
 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.057 
Number of Firms 2,104 1,924 1,924 1,924 
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Table 2. Robustness tests 
This table reports the robustness tests of Equations (1) and (2). Panel A only includes firms with at least 20 managerial 
forecast observations in columns (1) - (3) and at least 30 managerial forecast observations in columns (4) - (6). Panel B 
reports the results with alternative measurement for credit supply distortion (Distortion_2). Panel C shows the results with 
alternative measurements for managerial forecast ability (Facc_2, Fcon_2 and Facccon_2). Panel D reports the results 
with alternative measurement for investment efficiency (Invest_Eff_2). The definitions of Distortion_2, Facc_2, Fcon_2, 
Facccon_2 and Invest_Eff_2 are as shown in Subsection 3.2. We include but do not report all the control variables and 
fixed effects in this table for brevity purpose. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
 Forecast Observations >=20 Forecast Observations >=30 
Forecast= Facc 
Fc
on 
Fa
cccon Facc 
Fc
on Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distortion -0.002
***
 
-0.
002
***
 
-0.
002
***
 -0.002
***
 
-0.
002
***
 -0.002
***
 
 
(-3.99) 
(-3
.89) 
(-4
.02) (-3.52) 
(-3
.40) (-3.55) 
Distortion
*
Fo
recast 0.001
**
 
0.0
01
**
 
0.0
01
**
 0.001
*
 
0.0
01
*
 0.001
*
 
 
(2.08) 
(2.
14) 
(2.
17) (1.77) 
(1.
87) (1.86) 
Observations 59,157 
59,
157 
59,
157 47,759 
47,
759 47,759 
Adj. R
2
 0.058 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 0.060 
0.0
60 0.060 
Number of 
Firms 1,753 
1,7
53 
1,7
53 1,131 
1,1
31 1,131 
Panel B Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
Forecast= 
 
Facc Fcon Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distortion_2 -0.034
***
 -0.043
***
 -0.042
***
 -0.044
***
 
 
(-2.91) (-3.22) (-3.03) (-3.22) 
Distortion_2
*
Forecast 
 
0.024
**
 0.023
**
 0.025
**
 
  
(2.22) (2.06) (2.23) 
Observations 62,403 60,168 60,168 60,168 
Adj. R
2
 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.057 
Number of Firms 2,104 1,924 1,924 1,924 
Panel C Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
 Forecast= Facc_2 Fcon_2 Facccon_2 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Distortion -0.003
***
 -0.002
*
 -0.002
**
 
 
(-3.34) (-1.89) (-2.16) 
Forecast 0.001
***
 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 
 
(2.70) (3.28) (2.88) 
Distortion
*
Forecast 0.002
***
 0.001
*
 0.002
**
 
 
(2.80) (1.75) (2.33) 
Observations 31,101 31,101 31,101 
Adj. R
2
 0.057 0.055 0.056 
Number of Firms 1,816 1,816 1,816 
Panel D Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff_2) 
Forecast= 
 
Facc Fcon Facccon 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Distortion -0.002
***
 -0.002
***
 -0.002
***
 -0.002
***
 
 
(-3.35) (-3.64) (-3.54) (-3.69) 
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Distortion
*
Forecast 0.001
**
 0.001
**
 0.001
**
 
  
(2.04) (2.19) (2.14) 
Observations 63,317 61,017 61,017 61,017 
Adj. R
2
 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.060 
Number of Firms 2,147 1,930 1,930 1,930 
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Table 3. Extension analyses 
This table reports the subsample test results of Equation (2). Panel A reports the results for SOEs and non-SOEs. Panel B shows the results before and after the split-share structure reform. 
Panel C reports the results for the financial crisis and non-crisis periods. Panel D shows the impacts of positive or negative credit supply distortions on investment inefficiency. Columns (1) – (3) 
in Panel D examine the impacts of positive credit supply distortion on corporate overinvestment. Columns (4) – (6) in Panel D report the impacts of negative credit supply distortion on 
corporate underinvestment. The definitions of Overinvestment, Underinvestment, Distortion_P and Distortion_N are given in Subsection 3.3. We include but do not report all the control 
variables and fixed effects in this table for brevity purpose. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
 
Non-SOE SOE 
Forecast= Facc Fcon Facccon Facc Fcon Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distortion -0.003
**
 -0.003
***
 -0.004
***
 -0.002
**
 -0.001
*
 -0.001
**
 
 
(-3.74) (-3.99) (-3.99) (-2.08) (-1.84) (-1.98) 
Distortion
*
Forecast 0.001
**
 0.002
***
 0.002
**
 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(1.96) (2.61) (2.39) (0.35) (-0.16) (0.13) 
Observations 32,271 32,271 32,271 28,060 28,060 28,060 
Adj. R
2
 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.060 0.059 
Number of Firms 1,432 1,432 1,432 733 733 733 
Panel B Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
 
Before Reform After Reform 
Forecast= Facc Fcon Facccon Facc Fcon Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distortion -0.001 -0.002
*
 -0.002 -0.003
***
 -0.003
***
 -0.003
***
 
 
(-1.44) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-4.40) (-4.22) (-4.43) 
Distortion
*
Forecast 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
*
 0.001
*
 0.001
*
 
 
(1.15) (1.45) (1.38) (1.86) (1.85) (1.92) 
Observations 13,280 13,280 13,280 46,888 46,888 46,888 
Adj. R
2
 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.047 0.048 0.047 
Number of Firms 883 883 883 1,923 1,923 1,923 
 
 
Panel C Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
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Non-crisis During crisis 
Forecast= Facc Fcon Facccon Facc Fcon Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distortion -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
***
 -0.002
**
 -0.002
***
 
 
(-1.23) (-1.55) (-1.48) (-2.85) (-2.56) (-2.85) 
Distortion
*
Forecast 0.001 0.002
*
 0.002
*
 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.31) (1.90) (1.74) (1.60) (1.60) (1.62) 
Observations 27,990 27,990 27,990 32,178 32,178 32,178 
Adj. R
2
 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.048 0.048 0.048 
Number of Firms 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,775 1,775 1,775 
Panel D Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency (Invest_Eff) 
 
Political Connection No Political Connection 
Forecast= FaccD FconD Facccon FaccD FconD Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distortion -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006
***
 -0.006
**
 -0.006
***
 
 
(-1.21) (-1.04) (-1.15) (-2.63) (-2.58) (-2.60) 
Distortion
*
Forecast 0.003
**
 0.002
*
 0.002
*
 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.99) (1.73) (1.94) (1.22) (1.03) (1.16) 
Observations 10,180 10,180 10,180 7,371 7,371 7,371 
Adj. R
2
 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.048 
Number of Firms 560 560 560 516 516 516 
Panel E Dependent Variable = Overinvestment   
 
Dependent Variable = Underinvestment  
Forecast= Facc Fcon Facccon Forecast= Facc Fcon Facccon 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Distortion_P 0.001 0.001 0.001 Distortion_N 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 
 
(1.51) (1.13) (1.36) 
 
(3.84) (3.53) (3.75) 
Distortion_P
*
Forecast -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 Distortion_N
*
Forecast -0.001
***
 -0.001 -0.001
**
 
 
(-1.56) (-0.74) (-1.13) 
 
(-2.65) (-1.64) (-2.24) 
Observations 60,168 60,168 60,168 Observations 60,168 60,168 60,168 
Adj. R
2
 0.027 0.027 0.026 Adj. R
2
 0.044 0.043 0.043 
Number of Firms 1,924 1,924 1,924 Number of Firms 1,924 1,924 1,924 
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Appendix. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std dev Min Max 
Invest_Eff -0.021  -0.013  0.029  -0.241  0.000  
Distortion 0.774  0.591  0.604  0.004  2.351  
Facc 0.485  0.000  0.500  0.000  1.000  
Fcon 0.495  0.000  0.500  0.000  1.000  
Facccon 0.490  0.500  0.485  0.000  1.000  
Sales 0.184  0.142  0.156  0.001  0.895  
Cash 0.012  0.010  0.047  -0.145  0.177  
Leverage 0.467  0.471  0.219  0.045  1.000  
ROA 0.010  0.009  0.022  -0.085  0.093  
Agency 0.013  0.011  0.010  0.001  0.063  
Tangibility 0.301  0.268  0.199  0.003  0.816  
SA index -2.102  -2.065  0.638  -3.574  -0.669  
MTB 2.608  1.971  2.024  0.898  13.575  
Inventory 0.174  0.135  0.158  0.001  0.803  
Payable 0.091  0.071  0.075  0.002  0.385  
Invest_Eff_2 -0.022  -0.013  0.030  -0.247  0.000  
Distortion_2 0.024  0.014  0.026  0.000  0.087  
Facc_2 0.473  0.000  0.499  0.000  1.000  
Fcon_2 0.493  0.000  0.500  0.000  1.000  
Facccon_2 0.483  0.500  0.450  0.000  1.000  
Overinvestment  0.011  0.000  0.029  0.000  0.241  
Underinvestment  0.007  0.000  0.013  0.000  0.165  
Distortion_P 0.399  0.089  0.543  0.000  2.034  
Distortion_N 0.375  0.000  0.608  0.000  2.351  
 
 
